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Friend-to-Friend Privacy Protection  








Individual privacy settings allow members of Social Networking Sites (SNS) to share personal data with specifically selected 
contacts, such as close friends. This allows members to use SNS for sharing even more private data they would otherwise not 
want to share with all of their contacts. Although a considerable part of data sharing activities on SNS is limited to the direct 
contacts of its members, current research lacks insights on use and design of individual privacy settings. In this paper we 
investigate driving and inhibiting factors which explain the motivation of SNS members to use individual privacy settings. 
Thereby, we contribute a new facet to the general understanding of privacy protection behavior on SNS and also lay the 
ground for improving the design of individual privacy settings offered by SNS providers. We have drawn our results from a 
conducted grounded theory study based on 37 qualitative interviews with Facebook users. 
Keywords 
Social Networking Sites, Privacy Protection Behavior, Privacy Protection Strategies, Privacy Settings. 
INTRODUCTION 
Social Networking Sites (SNS; Beer, 2008) attract a large number of individuals, covering an ever-broadening spectrum of 
society. These online communities allow their members to meet, to articulate their social networks, to communicate, to share 
personal data and to refer to data from other Internet sources. After more than 15 years of growth and technical development 
(Boyd and Ellison, 2007), SNS have become an important part of many individuals’ daily lives and thus of society as a whole 
(Qualman, 2011). Along with this increase in the overall importance of SNS, there is a growing interest in users’ privacy 
protection behavior (Acquisti and Gross, 2006; Utz and Kramer, 2009), on the composition of members’ networks of contacts 
(Gilbert and Karahalios 2009; Hangal, MacLean, Lam, and Heer, 2010), and the related adaption of individuals’ offline 
behavior to SNS platforms (Boyd and Hargittai, 2010; Goffman, 1959; Wellman and Wortley, 1990). Here, an emerging field 
of research constitutes the friend-to-friend privacy protection field, e.g. research on the usage of individual privacy settings 
(Houghton and Joinson, 2010). 
We define individual privacy settings as those privacy settings that enable SNS members to share specific personal data and 
activities with selected parts of their network of contacts. For example, a private photo can be shared with some contacts 
while it is hidden from others. On Facebook, access rights can be granted to individual friends, by setting up closed groups or 
by using self- or pre-defined lists of friends. Although individual privacy settings are constantly improved (Bonneau and 
Preibusch, 2009), research on the usage of privacy settings in general and individual privacy settings in particular is scarce 
(Pavlou, 2011). Distinct knowledge about the application of individual privacy settings would help SNS providers, policy- 
and decision-makers who need to understand and address the increasing demand for information privacy on SNS. 
Consequently our research question is: What drives members to use individual privacy settings on SNS? 
In order to address this research question, we chose an exploratory research approach, following the Grounded Theory 
Methodology (GTM). Evidence from literature (Acquisti and Grossklargs, 2005; Acquisti and Gross, 2006; Utz and Kramer, 
2009) and personal experience of the authors indicate that motives of individuals to disclose personal data are manifold and 
complex. Without the need for pre-defined hypotheses, the GTM approach allows us to consider aspects that have not or only 
to some degree been considered in previous literature. In this study, we focus on Facebook as the world’s largest and most 
popular SNS. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide the theoretical background and the 
related work of our study. Following this, we describe our research methodology and we report and discuss our findings as 
well as their implications. Finally, we conclude this paper and give an outlook on further research. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Information privacy on SNS has become an increasingly important issue not just because of the growing number of users and 
the amount of personal data shared. Amplifying factors are “real names” initiatives of many SNS (Boyd, 2011), related 
questions on profile linkability (Zafarani and Liu, 2009), the integration of third-party services in SNS (Krishnamurthy and 
Wills, 2009) and social plugins for browsers and websites (Fletcher, 2010). 
A multitude of researchers have been addressing several SNS-related privacy aspects so far (Pavlou, 2011). For example, 
Nordberg, Horne and Horne (2007) describe a dichotomy between individuals’ attitudes towards privacy and their actual 
behavior. Acquisti and Grossklargs (2005) point to the willingness of many individuals to trade privacy for convenience, 
which also applies to SNS (Acquisti and Gross, 2006). Risks related to the participation on SNS have been elaborated, among 
them threats of identity fraud, identity theft, being stalked or being under surveillance (Gross and Acquisti, 2005). Besides a 
lack of awareness, motives of narcissism and impression management can trigger members’ acceptance of these risks (Utz 
and Kramer, 2009). 
In this study, we focus on a special aspect of privacy, the privacy protection towards connected contacts (‘friends’ in the 
terminology of Facebook). This is motivated by the fact that a considerable amount of SNS interaction takes place 
exclusively within the boundaries of members’ personal network of contacts. For example, more than 50% of Utz and 
Kramer’s (2009) sample, 64% of Young and Quan-Haase’s (2009) sample, and 76% of Taraszow’s et al. (2010) sample show 
that users restrict access to their personal data and activities solely to their network of friends. 
Based on this related work, the paper in hand aims to contribute to the current lack of knowledge on how members of SNS 
protect their privacy towards a non-anonymous audience on SNS. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we investigate the role of individual privacy settings as a means for privacy-enhancing behavior on SNS. 
Thereby we add a new facet to the general understanding of members’ privacy protection behavior and to the use of privacy 
controls in general (Boyd and Hargittai, 2010; Houghtona and Joinsona, 2010). While we acknowledge the existing work, we 
aim for a deeper understanding of that matter. We want to uncover individuals’ inner experiences and motivations leading to 
the usage of individual privacy settings on SNS. To do so, our data collection and data analysis is based upon the GTM 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Data Collection 
Facebook and its members have been chosen as the subject of our study because of (i) its large number of users (Fletcher, 
2010), (ii) its economic importance in comparison to other SNS (eMarketer.com, 2011), (iii) its socio-economic impact on 
society (Qualman, 2011) and particularly (iv) its large variety of data sharing functionality and privacy control mechanisms 
(Bonneau and Preibusch, 2009; also documented on http://blog.facebook.com/). We conducted 37 semi-structured interviews 
with Facebook members in three rounds between March and June 2011. As we strive for analytical generalizability, our 
sample selection strategy was open and based on random sampling. The sample comprises interviewees of different 
nationalities in the Western World, but with a focus on German informants (25 Germans, 4 British, 3 Americans, 2 Finns, 1 
Canadian, 1 Italian, 1 Dutch). Interviewees range in age from 15 to 47 years, with 26 male and 11 female interviewees, total 
Facebook experience between a few days and five years and networks of friends on Facebook ranging from 11 to 1,581 
contacts. 
In order to avoid a bias in replies to privacy related questions (Braunstein, Granka and Staddon, 2011), our first slice of data 
was collected using anonymous Facebook channels on the Internet Relay Chat (http://www.irc.org/). This first slice of data 
comprised 13 personal chat protocols, summing up 46 pages of text. We used this data as a valid analytical benchmark for 
subsequent face-to-face interviews. The second and third data slices comprised eight and 16 semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with Facebook users. On average, each of the face-to-face interviews lasted about 30 minutes. Each interview has 
been audio-recorded and transcribed, resulting in up to 220 transcript pages of text. After the second round of interviews and 
the analysis of the third slice of data, we jointly concluded that theoretical saturation was reached (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 
2006). 
Data Analysis 
Data collection and analysis were conducted in parallel. Intermediary results were analyzed and discussed already in between 
the three rounds of interviews. The collected insights were compared to already existing insights to spot and explain potential 
contradictions and to extend the interview guide accordingly. Following this cycle of constant comparison (Corbin and 
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Strauss, 2008) allowed us to obtain a consistent understanding about factors driving or inhibiting the usage of individual 
privacy settings on SNS. The process of data analysis is clustered in two parts. First, in the process of open coding, we 
identified concepts that explain or generally influence the usage of individual privacy settings. This included a process of 
abstraction where we identified a few concepts as core categories and other concepts as properties of categories. In the 
second step (axial coding), we clustered the categories in categories with a positive influence on the usage of individual 
privacy settings (drivers), categories with a negative influence on the usage of individual privacy settings (inhibitors), and 
contextual factors. 
STUDY FINDINGS: DRIVERS AND INHIBITORS FOR USING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY SETTINGS 
In this section, we present driving and inhibiting motives of SNS members for the usage of the individual privacy settings. 
Those categories explaining motives for using individual privacy settings (drivers) are marked with (+), whereas categories 
describing motives for not using individual privacy settings (inhibitors) are marked with (-). 
(+) Follow real life communication patterns: In the offline world, terms like “friend” and “networks of friends” describe 
social roles and define relationships between people (Wellman and Wortley, 1990). In Facebook, the term “friend” implies 
that there is a mutually confirmed connection between two individuals. In relation to that, our analyzed data confirms what 
had already been indicated by literature (Gilbert and Karahalios, 2009; Hangal et al., 2010) – most networks of friends in 
Facebook are composed of contacts in different relation to the individual: “Not all of my Facebook friends are friends in 
reality. There are also colleagues, family members or people that I have met no more than once in my life” (Interviewee 
Paul1). In the offline world many individuals would treat each contact in a differentiated manner (Wellman and Wortley, 
1990). We identified three strategies describing how network members transfer this behavior to the Facebook platform: 
• By limiting what personal data to disclose: “I’m limiting what I put in there. It’s too complicated to define who can see 
what.” (Interviewee Bernard). 
• By limiting whom to accept in their network: “In fact my network of friends only consists of friends. For colleagues and so 
on I’m using a different network.” (Interviewee Fabian). 
• By limiting distribution of personal data: “In Facebook I share nearly everything with my best friends, like in real life. 
However, other Facebook friends like colleagues or people I met during my studies or on holidays I mainly want to stay in 
touch. I don’t want to share everything with them.” (Interviewee Adele). 
Individual privacy settings allow members to combine contacts with whom they have different social relations in their 
network of friends without the need to reduce their level of activity. Individual privacy settings are used by members who 
intend to follow communication patterns of the real world, that is, to take and act accordingly to different roles members have 
in their everyday life (Goffmann, 1959). 
(+) Protect against misuse: A key motivation of privacy protection is to avoid misuse or unintended use of disclosed 
information. Most interviewees mentioned that they consider the SNS provider Facebook and people who are not part of their 
network of friends as main origins for threats of misuse or unintended use: “I think people I’ve added or accepted as friends 
are trustworthy. They won’t misuse my data. I’m afraid that people I’m not connected to could misuse my data.” (Interviewee 
Hans). However, some interviewees also reported that they have experienced negative situations caused by friends who 
misused the data they had disclosed: “I restricted access for some of my friends because when I met my new boyfriend one 
girl was trying to make things hard for me.” (Interviewee Dorotha). Compared to typical threats of misuse originating from 
the SNS provider (e. g. personal data is sold) or to unknown people outside the network of friends (e. g. human resources 
agent who uses this data in a job interview), consequences of misuse or unintended use by friends are closer and more 
immediate.  
(+) Prevent misinterpretation: Whereas only some of our interviewees stated being afraid that their shared personal data 
could be misused by some of their friends, more than two-thirds of the asked respondents stated that they were afraid their 
data could wrongly be interpreted and thus creating a false image of themselves. “What other people think about me is 
important to me. I read the news feed regularly and this determines how I think about others - especially of those I have not 
seen for a longer time. When I met them again I noticed several times, that my impression of them was completely wrong. 
Maybe this is because Facebook displays only some information. I don’t like to get a wrong impression of others but it would 
be worse if others got a wrong impression of me.” (Interviewee Quentin). We identified two components, which the 
interviewees consider to be responsible for potentially wrong interpretations of their shared personal data: 
                                                          
1
 All names of interviewees in this paper are pseudonyms. 
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• Incomplete data, representing snapshots of members’ lives: “The party photos I posted there represent just a small part of 
my life. However, as most of my photos in Facebook are party photos one could assume partying is a major part of my 
life.” (Interviewee Steve). 
• Misleading data (e. g., irony, sarcasm or insider jokes): “I’ve got a special kind of humor. Sometimes I post absolute 
nonsense just for fun. Outsiders who don’t know me and just read this might think I’m an idiot.” (Interviewee Taylor). 
Compared to the motive for protection against misuse, preventing misinterpretation seems to be a more important reason why 
members use individual privacy settings. The motive has been mentioned also by interviewees who share personal data only 
on an occasional basis.  
(+) Keep others interested: A few interviewees reported using individual privacy settings to prevent spamming friends, who 
might not be interested in their postings: “Nobody is interested in everything. I try to post messages only to those friends who 
I think are interested or affected by it.” (Interviewee Eleni). Although the level of active contribution varies across our 
interviewees, every interviewee uses the social network, especially the Facebook Newsfeed, as means to stay informed or to 
be up-to-date: “Reading the newsfeed is like reading a newspaper, it keeps me up-to-date and many things I forget 
immediately...” (Interviewee Ralph). In addition, each interviewee stated he or she could identify content he or she is more 
interested in than in others. We noted that members distinguish between two types of content: 
• Informational Content (links, pictures, videos, music): Members distinguish content based on whether they are interested in 
the topic of the posted content, independent from whom of their friends posted the content: “I am interested in soccer. If 
someone has posted an interesting link or a video then I’ll have a look at it”. (Interviewee Zara). 
• Social Content (status updates, profile updates, comments, private photos): Content is considered to be more interesting if 
members can identify a connection to their personal life or if unusual, non-daily things are reported: “A friend of mine 
posted that he went to the cinema at the weekend. When I talked to him a few days later we talked about the movie. Most 
people in my Facebook network I meet only a few times a year, in their case I would only be interested if they experienced 
something extraordinary at the weekend.”(Interviewee Neal). 
Our collected empirical data indicates that the schema outlined above may represent only the tip of an even more complex 
decision-making schema on how people judge the attractiveness of SNS content. 
(-) Avoid effort: The configuration of individual privacy settings requires time and effort. We identified three dimensions of 
effort, which SNS members have to take into account in order to apply individual privacy settings properly: 
• Effort to get an initial understanding of how (individual) privacy settings work: “It took me quite some time to understand 
how to configure the access rights for different parts of my friends network […] I had to read and browse through many of 
these privacy setting menus.” (Interviewee Wendy). 
• Effort to configure individual privacy settings: “I like this function but I’m not using it, I’m just too lazy. I don’t add people 
I don’t like.” (Interviewee Garry). 
• Effort to pay attention and react on potential changes in privacy setting functionality: “[...] there are many changes in the 
system I haven’t noticed immediately. I can just trust in the power of media or to be duly informed by my own network of 
friends.” (Interviewee Steve). 
Most interviewees use individual privacy settings at least occasionally, if they want to hide a specific content from certain 
friends or if they want to grant access to a specific content (e. g. a photo) to only a few friends. Less than half of the 
respondents use self-defined lists of friends to assign individual access rights. When asked about why they have not created 
lists of friends, “required effort” has been one of the first mentioned reasons. 
(-) Save social capital: Individual privacy settings allow following real life communication patterns by treating different 
friends differently. One facet of this is to separate groups of friends from each other that have no connection in real life as 
well: “Apart from some intersections, most of the groups I’ve formed don’t know one another. For each group I appear 
differently… in the sports club I behave differently than at work. I don’t want these two appearances to merge.” (Interviewee 
Quentin). In social network theory, these different groups are termed as small world networks (Watts, 2003). For example, 
probably most of the members of the sports club are connected to one another (small world network 1) or probably most of 
the work colleagues are connected to one another (small world network 2). But sport club members and colleagues are only 
connected to one another via one “weak tie” (Granovetter, 1973) – Interviewee Quentin. Against this background, we noticed 
that people use individual privacy settings to distinguish small world networks in their network of friends, but they hesitate to 
use individual privacy settings to distinguish between friends, who are part of the same small world network: “This has the 
potential to destroy friendships. At least it could cause severe discussions in the sense ‘why did you hide this from me while A 
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can see it’? For me this would be worse than for example the case where my personal data is sold to a marketing agency.” 
(Interviewee Neal). Here, a notable difference between privacy protection in real world scenarios and online privacy 
protection occurs: “In the real life this is a tacit decision, on Facebook I have to pigeonhole my friends and I don’t want them 
to see this.” (Interviewee Neal). Especially within small world networks, the usage of individual privacy settings thus bears 
the risk of destroying accumulated social capital. 
(-) Issues of missing trust in SNS provider: Facebook provides a technical platform for social interaction. Each activity on 
this platform and associated services could be traced, stored and analyzed by Facebook. Although most users seem to accept 
this fact, some interviewees have reported to react on this by reducing their level of activity. Their dominant privacy 
protection strategy is to limit disclosure towards Facebook: “I’ve many friends who don’t trust Facebook. They don’t use 
individual privacy settings not because they don’t consider them useful, but because they don’t disclose anything they would 
have to protect.” (Interviewee Oliver). We noticed this position in different notions. One interviewee reported disclosing 
only the minimal amount of information required to get registered in order to be able to only consume information passively. 
Others reported limiting their level of active contribution because they do not trust Facebook, although in principle they 
would like to use it more intensely. This category demonstrates that a minimum level of activity by members is necessary 
before the use of (individual) privacy settings becomes meaningful. 
(-) Issues of privacy setting reliability: Another motive for not using individual privacy settings is because respondents 
distrust the reliability of privacy setting functionalities. We identified two dimensions of reliability: 
• Reliability that privacy settings are not changed unexpectedly: “I don’t use these privacy settings because they change 
these settings so often. I limit what I put on Facebook.” (Interviewee Ian). 
• Reliability that privacy settings work in the way members expect them to work: “Recently I was tagged on a photo and 
friends of mine made fun out of it. I found this strange as I thought I had disabled tagging. Sometimes you cannot control 
what happens.” (Interviewee Taylor). 
Members entrust content and personal data to the platform under the assumption that this is protected by the provided privacy 
protection mechanisms. Doubts in the reliability of privacy protection functionalities and users’ self-doubt to apply them 
correctly will limit the amount of personal data people share on the platform. 
(+/-) Individual context of SNS usage: On an individual level, we noticed that members who actively contribute to the SNS 
consider drivers and inhibitors to be more important than members with a focus on passive consumption. In addition, 
members with larger networks of contacts composed of several small world networks tend to consider drivers and inhibitors 
to be more important than members with small contact networks composed of few small world networks. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Drivers, inhibitors and individuals’ context of SNS usage shape a preliminary causal model of factors determining or 
generally influencing the usage of individual privacy settings. Figure 1 summarizes these findings and provides a first 
tentative conceptual model.  
Drivers
− Follow real life 
communication patterns
− Protect against misuse
− Prevent misinterpretation
− Keep others interested
Inhibitors
− Avoid Effort
− Save social capital
− Issues of missing trust in 
SNS provider
− Issues of privacy setting 
reliability
Usage of Individual 
Privacy Settings
Individual
Context of SNS Usage
− Focus of Activities:
• Passive consumption
• Active contribution





Figure 1. Preliminary Causal Model of the Usage of Individual Privacy Settings 
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A few interviewees do not use individual privacy settings because of their intent to share their personal data (general image, 
ideas, views or opinions) with the greatest possible audience. However, most of the interviewees stated that, at a certain level 
of activity and disclosure, the possibility of following and establishing real-life communication patterns via SNS is 
indispensable. Many of those who do not use individual privacy settings reported that they would like to use Facebook more 
intensively only if their concerns about the usage of individual privacy settings are resolved or alleviated. 
Overcoming the inhibiting factors requires the SNS to provide the same means that people apply to their privacy protection 
behavior in the offline world. Aside from the mentioned issues on the trustworthiness of the platform provider, many of the 
elaborated inhibitors point to design issues of privacy controls for privacy protection in a non-anonymous online space like 
Facebook. For example, the inhibitor “Save social capital” can be addressed by blurring whether a part of the profile is 
actually hidden or whether a friend has not filled in this part of the profile. The identified drivers for the usage of individual 
privacy settings provide indications on how to support users in configuring their privacy settings, for example, to reduce their 
configuration effort. 
Although we claim that our main results can be generalized, the actual importance of different drivers or inhibitors might 
vary depending on the sample selection. Our informants are mainly from Western countries and as indicated, most of them 
who use individual privacy settings do so in order to prevent misinterpretation, whereas only some of them use it as a means 
to protect against misuse and unintended use. This situation might be different in countries that do not have the guarantee of 
freedom of speech. Other factors such as users’ characteristics and goals, skills, power or culture may also play key roles in 
causal explanations. In the first instance, the results apply to Facebook. However, at the given level of abstraction we claim 
that the general results are also applicable to other SNS as well. This claim can be supported by the statements of many 
interviewees who reported to behave similarly on other SNS they use. 
The findings provide an empirical and theoretical baseline for improving existing privacy controls. Moreover, the provided 
insights may help researchers, policy- and decision-makers to better understand how individuals extend their presentation of 
themselves in their everyday life in a non-anonymous online space. Social plugins for e-mail browsers, social 
recommendation systems or even more privacy sensitive online services such as electronic healthcare platforms (e. g. 
http://www.patientslikeme.com) and electronic patient records (e. g. http://healthvault.com) are further areas to which the 
provided insights might be applicable. 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The motivations of members to use (or not use) individual privacy settings are complex and manifold. They comprise 
questions of general attitudes towards privacy, towards the platform provider but also towards members’ own network of 
contacts. These questions are all worth answering since an increasing amount of personal data on SNS is mainly shared 
exclusively within the boundaries of members’ network of contacts. Overcoming the inhibiting factors would allow for a 
more personal use, which promises to increase the overall network activity. While acknowledging the limitations of our 
approach, we would not have been able to produce this substantial, innovative insight without applying grounded theory 
techniques. Our model aims to provide a first theoretical baseline for quantitative studies on members’ motivation to use 
individual privacy settings. However, the elaborated motives for using individual privacy settings require further 
specification to be transferable into constructs, propositions, testable hypotheses or design guidelines. Consequently, we 
encourage further qualitative and quantitative work in this domain, to challenge and to comment on our insights. 
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